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Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy has entailed the substitution of
new income support instruments for the former price based instruments, mainly
in the cash crop sector. Our first point is that the domestic political
balance was unable to generate such a large change in policy design, in
spite of inefficiencies and inbalances. The pressure of the US has been
a major factor in the design of the reform. We argue that trade interests
have been crucial to catalyze international collective action in order to
countervail domestic pressure groups. The pursuit of an agreement in the GATT
is therefore a means to place a cap on the CAP and foster some reform and control
over sectors such as sugar and dairy in other countries. We do not foresee the
disappearance of sources of tensions between the two countries, as EC
animal products become more competitive and as the working of the CAP in the
vicinity of world prices will make trade flows sensitive to world macro-economic
and agricultural shocks. The Uruguay Round, should not be considered as
fully satisfactory, and the long-run objective of further decoupling of
payments from production incentives should be pursued.2
1. INTRODUCTION
The last ten years have witnessed a substantial reevaluation of
agricultural policies in developed countries. The launching of the Uruguay
Round and the insistence that agricultural issues be dealt with, under the
pressure of the United States (US) and other net exporters of temperate
zone products, has created an environment for debate and action. The European
Community's (EC) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been the main target of
attack that has resulted in EC-US conflict with hot and cool moments according
to the stages of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
negotiations and to the various negotiation tactics employed in the Urugay Round.
The present paper focuses on the interpretation of the CAP reform in the
context of the Uruguay Round and the EC-US agricultural trade conflict. The
questions addressed are first to explain why agriculture has, for the first
time, been given such a central role and why the CAP reform has developed
in the way we have witnessed, tackling firmly the cash crop programs and
leaving nearly untouched the most protected dairy and sugar sectors. Our main
point is that changes in comparative advantages and the existence of big trade
interests in cash crops, organized by the main player, i.e., the United
States, was the main force to circumvent the otherwise dominant special interest
forces in favor of the status quo. This explains convincingly the actual
design of the CAP reform and even the changes brought to the Commission
projects by the EC Council.
The second point is that the GATT framework provides to the competitive
exporters a means to constrain the CAP in the future. But, because the GATT is
based on general principles and should not be commodity specific, the accord has
to be stated more generally and should accordingly force all countries to reform
their own highly protected and less competitive subsectors. The GATT would
therefore put a cap on the CAP and on other protectionist farm policies, as
well.
However,all countries try to minimize the political cost of adjustment,
and reforms of the CAP and of other policies still leave a lot of room for
payments to be too tied to production incentives,at the expense of environmental
amenities. Will the GATT be able to tame and reorient farm policies in the
socially desirable directions?3
Section 2 briefly reviews the historical EC-US trade debate. Section 3
deals with the EC-US special interests and trade conflicts, Section 4 analyses
the CAP reform implications on the EC-US relations and relates it to the
expected GATT treaty. Section 5 addresses more long-run issues, stressing the
shortcomings of the CAP reform and future prospects for the GATT as a framework
to discipline domestic and trade farm policies, including their
environmental dimensions.
2. THE EC-US AGRICULTURAL CONFLICT
The history and the role of agriculture in the GATT shows that the
successive Rounds of negotiations were dominated by EC-US disputes. Several
issues in the EC-US agricultural trade conflict emerged soon after the
creation of the Common Market and the implementation of the CAP. This
conflict reached a new stage with the economic growth of EC agriculture,
and it became the focus of negotiations in Uraguay Round.
The trade balance in agricultural products between the EC and the US has
traditionally been in favor of the US. US exports to the EC reached about 10
billion US $ at the end of the seventies, but fell to nearly 6
1985. It has slowly recovered over the rest of the decade (Figure
billion in
2.1).
Figure 2.1. EC-US bilateral agricultural trade
Sources: USDA Agricultural Statistics (US exports to the EC)  USDA World
Agricultural Trends and Indicators (EC exports to the US), La situation de
1'Agriculture dans La Communaute', various issues (exchange  rate).The composition of bilateral trade flows in agricultural products is
however quite different (Figure 2.2). The US exports to the EC essentially
basic commodities (grains, oilseeds products and corn by-products) which are
heavily regulated in both the EC and the US with a generally higher
level of protection granted in the EC, except for corn by-products. EC
exports to the US include more processed food products with a high value
added per ton. For the most part,they are non-CAP commodities, such as wine
and beer. Meat and dairy products are also exported. The latter are supported
in the EC, but they are also subject to strict trade barriers in the US.
Figure 2.2. Structure of bilateral agricultural trade between
the US and the EC (year 1990)
US eqxwb to Um EC C/6 mIllion  1 ECapubtofhoUS4434m8txmt
Sources: from USDA,Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, 1992.
The sources of the trade tensions between the EC and the US have originated
in both the bilateral trade interests and in the competition for outlets in
third countries. The latter source has taken momentum with the increasingly net
exporting position of the EC.
The major concern of the US has always been to alleviate or reverse the
consequences of the CAP on trade,in cereals and related feed stuffs. The
US was in favor of European Integration, but has never really accepted
the creation of the customs union and the subsequent principles of the CAP. The
issue at stake is the high protection in the EC for grains which first reduced5
potential US outlets for these products in the EC and made it necessary for
the EC to protect other sectors too. Moreover, the use of the variable levy
- restitution system, compared to a "gate on a dam" by the US Agriculture
Secretary Freeman, was constantly criticized by the US and other exporters as
being in contradiction with the GATT principles. In the Kennedy Round, the US
wanted to modify the variable levy system, and in the Tokyo Round she wanted
levies considered as non-tariff measures and treated accordingly. The US did
not get preferential access to the EC for grains in negotiations following the
first enlargement of the EC, but did so in 1986 after the accession of Spain
and Portugal.
Tensions increased when the EC turned to a net exporting position in
grains in the early eighties. Variable restitutions, the major EC protecting
device, have been under constant pressure from the US (the share of
restitutions in EC agricultural expenditures has increased from 20  in 1975
to 35 % in 1990). This new situation has launched a creeping trade war on the
world grain market, with the US developing a permanent program of export
subsidies. In the Tokyo Round, the code for subsidies attempted to reinforce
Article XVI with the "concept of an equitable share of world export", but
the implementation of this vague limit did not prevent a rapid growth of EC grain
exports. The US has become increasingly frustrated by these developments which
explain its insistence on a separate negotiation on export subsidies in the
Uruguay Round.
Two other major trade concerns of the US, namely oilseeds and corn
by-products,are indirectly determined by the EC grain policy. The EC conceded
a bound zero tariff on oilseeds products in the XXIV-6 Negotiation, on corn germ
meal in 1962 and on corn gluten feed in the Kennedy Round in 1967. These
concessions have proved over time to make it increasingly difficult for the EC
to pursue its high grain price policy. First, the EC wanted to increase
its capacity to produce oilseeds in order to reduce dependence on imports, a
policy triggered by the US soybean embargo and the peak world prices of 1972-74.
Oilseeds production in the EC has been stimulated by a price support and by
a crushing subsidy mechanism (which works broadly as deficiency payments).
This mechanism has proved to be very costly as production increased sharply.
Increased production was further enhanced by the slowly diminishing support
given to grains as a reaction to excess supply. As a result, the cost of theoilseeds program has risen to 3.4 billion ECU in 1990.
Meanwhile,imports of by-products used in compound feeds have soared




created an attractive outlet for US corn by-products that accounted for more
than 1 billion US $ of imports in 1990.  Because of the trade interests in
soybean and corn gluten feed,the US has resisted vigorously attempts by the
EC to"rebalance" its external protection either by placing a tax on
vegetable fats or by voluntary export restraint on grain substitutes. In
the early eighties, the strong dollar and the emerging competition from
Brazil and Argentina caused a general reduction in US exports to the EC (Figure
2.1), particularly in US trade shares of EC soybean imports (Figures 2.3 and
2.4). Pushed by the American Soybean Association, the US filed a GATT
complaint in 1988 alleging that the EC discriminated against the imports
of US soybeans. The appointed panel concluded in 1989 this was indeed the
case. The Commission of the European Communities (CEC) accepted the
conclusions, with some reservations, and implemented a subsidy per hectare of
oilseeds produced.
Figure 2.3. EC-12 soybean imports by source
Sources: from USDA, World Agriculture, March 1988, and ISTA, Oil World Annual,
various years.7
Figure 2.4. EC-12 soybean meal imports by source
Sources : from ISTA, Oil World Annual, various years.
These trade interests and the US competitive advantage in crops explain
its emphasis on reducing border protection first. The trap in which the EC
has put itself is due to its long standing grain policy and its direct
(restitutions) and indirect (feed imports) consequences. This situation has
recently given theUS a formidable leverage to press the EC toward reforming the
CAP. The various recent skirmishes on other trade disputes (definition of
corn gluten feed,delisting of US beef and pork packing plants, the
procymidone case, the EC sugar complaint....) can be considered as minor
avatars to the central conflict. In contrast,the EC's attitude in relation to
the US is not so much dictated by trade interests as it is by a continuous
attempt to cope with the adverse consequences of earlier made decisions in
the framework of the CAP. The EC exports to the US are mainly non-CAP
products (Figure 2.2) which sell competitively and are designated targets for
occasional retaliation. As a consequence,the behavior of the EC has been
mainly passive or reactive to US pressures. From the beginning, the EC
considered the CAP as nonnegotiable, variable levies and restitutions
being viewed as logical consequences of domestic policies emanating from
domestic pressures. In the early stages of the Round, the EC constantly refused
to negotiate separately on border measures.
  Another distinctive feature in the EC approach to trade policy has
been its desire to"organize world markets" through International Commodity
Agreements (ICA's). These ICA's have not really worked and the US has always
been reluctant to manage world trade or to indulge in implicit
cartellization of agricultural trade.
The so-called harmonization of border protection in the EC is another
example where trade policy changes are dictated by the EC's feeling the need to
tackle the consequences of domestic policies.The cost of the grain and oilseeds
regimes has led to a recurrent debate in the EC about fat taxation, which evolved
into the concept of harmonization of border protection (CEC, 1989) whereby
domestic support would be reduced as a concession for import taxation of
animal feeds. Hence, the inclusion of rebalancing in all of the EC GATT
proposals, a demand that the US was never willing to consider as a possible .
concession in the Round.
In sum, the recent reform of the CAP reflects the typical lagged
response of the EC to the adverse effects of pressures created by past
policies,except the extent of this reform seems to be in excess of that
which would come about from domestic pressures alone.
3. THE EC-US AGRICULTURAL TRADE GAME AND THE DESIGN OF THE CAP REFORM
3.1. Sources of domestic pressures for a reform of the CAP
In its introduction to the July 1991 "Communication to the Council" (CEC,
COM(91) 258 final),the EC Commission repeats the conclusions of its previous
reflections (CEC, COM(91)  100 final) on the current state of the CAP and on the
need for fundamental changes. Quoted arguments include, i) price guarantees lead
to growing output, ii) extra output can be accommodated only by adding to
stocks or by exports to already oversupplied world markets, iii) built-in
incentives for high input intensity places the environment at risk, and iv)
rising budgetary expenditures, devoted in large part to a small minority of
farms, provides no solution to the problems of farm incomes in general.
These reasons for CAP reform are well known. They reflect the outcome
of policies which cannot be adjusted for various political reasons in the
familiar agricultural context of rapid technical change - partly induced by
the support   and of sluggish demand due to the staple nature of the products9
of the industry.The inefficiencies and market imbalances which result are
also known, as well as the regressive distributional effects of the
considerable and steadily rising budget expenditures. It is more difficult and
conjectural to point out the actual causes for the recent reform which, although
not comprehensive,is the most drastic since the inception of the caap.
Given the magnitude of the protests triggered by Commission
pronouncements on reform and of the subsequent modification of the reform by
the Council,one can only be surprised that a significant reform still took
place in a manner so central to the EC agriculture, and in such a
market-oriented manner.One can also be surprised at the large price cut decided
for grains and oilseeds while,in a similar domestic context, the course of
action adopted in the dairy sector in 1984 was the other extreme, i.e.,
production quotas. Actually, the latter solution was highly supported by large
producer groups and even by countries. So, in the current reform program, what
prevented this idea from being applied to the crop sector?
It is our conviction that domestic forces were unable to generate the
current extent of reform even though it was eventually circumscribed to the main
cash crops, a lesser extent to beef, and accompanied by sizeable
compensation payments,which have become increasingly tied to the endowments of
the farmers. The final package of CAP reform appears to be more the result of
external pressures1. This view is supported by the observation that the dairy
and sugar sectors,where trade conflicts do not concern trade interests of the
big players, only experienced a cap on current policies. This view is also
supported by the land set aside program in the reformed CAP, which is mainly for
purposes of reducing excess supply,and thus exports with little attention to
environmental concerns.
3.2. EC, US and the international game
Our focus here is on how international pressure influenced the nature
of CAP reform. Our general theme is that the legitimacy of the GATT rests
on its principles,and that the broad based rejection of these principles for
1The prospect for increased feed demand in the EC did however help the
Commission in reaching an agreement among members for a more market oriented
approach to the 1992 reform of the CAP.agriculture wouldcontinue to perpetuate shocks to international markets of
magnitudes greaterthan the collective interests of either the US or the EC
were willing to accept. The role of special interests within each country,
and the extent of interdependencies  among exporting and importing countries,
influenced the actual direction and magnitude of the CAP reform and the GATT
compromise.
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3.2.1. The nature of special interests in agriculture
The plethora of papers on the formation of special interests and
their motivation to seek, through economic policy, income transfers that are
not easily undone has clearly sharpened our understanding of their influence
in forestalling and directing policy reform in agriculture. To suggest how
international pressures influenced the nature and extent of CAP reform, it is
useful to briefly mention several factors that strengthen the capacity of
narrow based interest groups to influence agricultural policy to a degree
greater than would otherwise be suggested by their representation in the
polity2. We group these factors into two broad categories: institutional and
economic.
Institutional structures that are part of the policy making-policy
implementation process cause an inertia to reform. Agriculture in many of the
industrialized market economies tends to typify the extensiveness of theses
structures relative to the other traded goods sectors of their economies, and
particularly so for the CAP. They tend to make reform more difficult because of
the various channels of political connections, legislative committees, legal
statues and other organizations at the regional and local levels that
support, implement and provide communication mechanisms to agriculture.
Policy reform that entails a dismantling of this structure, particularly after
it has been in place for an extended period of time, is often questioned
on the grounds that it will expose the sector to the vagaries of the market
without mechanisms in place to help farmers insure against future
contingencies. This structure too has a vested interest in sustaining the status
2Petit  provides an insightful discussion of some of the earlier
determinants of agricultural policies in the US and the EC while Josling et al
discuss some of the more current factors influencing the direction of policy.11
quo I while at the same time
making process. ConsequentlyI
it has strong control over the public decision
it and its vested interests tend to dampen
internal motivation for reform, while at the same time, increasing the
difficulty from those outside the structure to induce reforms3.
Several economic factors also provide agricultural interests with
political influence beyond their relative number in the population.
First, the cost of policy that supports incomes in agriculture
tends to be dispersed over the entire economy while the benefits are
concentrated on a few. As Olson (1965) has suggested, because farmers are
small in number relative to a country's population, they have two major
advantages. Their small number decreases their individual costs of arranging
a group consensus to seek legislation in their favor and their specialization
in one or two major activities allows them to earn per capita benefits from
support which far exceed the per capita costs incurred by consumers and
taxpayers. Hence, since food accounts for a small proportion of total
household expenditures, producer groups tend to be more motivated to expend
resources to achieve their more narrow political interests than
consumers and taxpayers are in general willing to countervail these forces.
Second, due to the uncertain and cyclical nature of agricultural
markets caused by climatic,macroeconomic and world trade shocks, agricultural
support is often introduced in the presence of upturns in the macroeconomic
business cycle. But, it tends to be only marginally withdrawn during downturns
in the cycle and its is generally increased during periods of macroeconomic
uncertainty (Paarlberg, 1989). Part of the reason is that agricultural
production is characterized by sector specific resources such as land,
buildings and equipment that cannot be easily reallocated to other sectors
during cyclical downturns in the agricultural economy. Consequently, the value
of these resources can fall precipitously during decreasing cycles or lag behind
the upturns in the macroeconomic economy,all of which places the welfare of
rural households, financial institutions supplying credit to the sector and
variable input suppliers at some, risk relative to the overall economy. This
risk invariably induces
3See Munk (1989) fora further discussion of the public finance pressures
for reform in the contextof the current GATT round of negotiations.
support for agriculture (Orden, 1990). Part of the12
reason that support is only partially withdrawn appears to lie in the fact that
just as cyclical downturns affect the value of these resources, so do too the
very economic policies designed to avert these effects on their value. That
is, the value of agriculture's sector specific assets embody the implicit value
bestowed upon them by the instruments themselves4. Hence, when economic
conditions improve, policies tend to remain in place. Producers are aware of
the linkage between the value of sector specific resources and economic
support. They are aware of the potential decline in value if support is
withdrawn and therefore they have an incentive to engage in political
actions to avert this eventuality. Hence,policies designed to offset the
effects of uncertainty and cycles in the economy tend to turn into
permanent support.
A third closely related incentive to maintain support after a cyclical
downturn is that the increased value of the sector specific resources that
support causes also provide incentives for capital deepening in land
improvements, buildings, equipment and so on.Since this capital deepening is
induced by support, the returns to this new capital is dependent on
maintaining support. Together, these two effects provide incentives for the
racheting up of economic support for agriculture.
Fourth, agriculture is often associated with environmental amenities,
rural development and to natural resources. It appears that the
economic support to the producers of agricultural commodities is easily
confused with support for rural development, support for the country life in
general and the environment in particular, the more so as these amenities
are public goods without a collectively organized constituency to promote their
supply at the socially desirable level.
And fifth, food is closely associated with security (an alleged reason
for Japan's support of her rice producers), and health, particularly in the form
of food safety.Food safety can easily serve as a justification for non-tariff
barriers and extensive regulation.
The culmination of these various factors tends to provide some sectors
4See Goodwin and Ortalo-Magne for a recent empirical study of the
influence of commodity programs on the prices of land in Canada, France and
the US.13
in agriculture with more political power to influence policy in their favor
than others. Johnson et al. (1993) obtained empirical estimates of these
relative influences for the US and the EC based on data from 1986, while
another study has reaffirmed these approximate magnitudes using data from
1990. Sugar and dairy interests in both the US and the EC exhibited the most
influence, followed by producers of animal feeds and grains. Taxpayers (as
reflected by the budget costs of agricultural programs) and consumers had
the least influence. The influence of beef, pork and poultry producers tended
to rank higher in the EC than in the US. Hence, from an interest group
perspective alone, it is not surprising that, i) reform is likely to be more
difficult to obtain in the sugar and dairy sectors of either the EC or the US
relative to the grain sector and, ii) if reform is to be obtained, some
form of compensatory payments will surely be required. It is also apparent
that acceptance of the GATT principles for agriculture, even if reform is modest,
will be an important disciplinary cap to the influence of these interest groups.
3.2.2. The nature of interdependencies between the agricultural
economies of the major players
The interdependent effects of EC-US agricultural policies are fairly
well known. Effectively, the various studies are in general agreement that
the own effects of policy reform are greater than the indirect effects of
reform in the EC (US) on the agricultural economy of the US (EC). For example,
the results of Johnson et al. (1993) suggest that if the US reforms while the
EC follows the status quo, the world prices of wheat and coarse grains,
milk and milk by-products, and sugar rise while the prices of animal feed
concentrates (oil cakes and vegetable proteins), pork and poultry tend to
fall. If the EC reforms while the US follows the status quo, the world prices
of wheat and coarse grains, milk and milk by-products, and sugar also tend to
rise, as do the prices of beef. The prices of animal feed concentrates, and
pork and poultry tend to fall. However, changes in domestic prices and
quantities produced always tend to be greater from own reform than from
indirect effects of reform in the other country. As a consequence, federal
budget savings, the decline in producer quasi rents, the increase in consumer
surplus and the net social gains in either the US or the EC are always greater14
for own policy reform than from the indirect effects of EC (US) reform on the
US (EC). Since grains are the major traded commodities for the US and for
many members of the Cairns Group of countries, the greatest interdependence
lies in the grain sector which in turn impacts on animal feeds, beef and pork
and poultry. To exporters,this interdependence in grains has of course been
the major cause for frustration with the CAP's variable levies, export
subsidies and other policies that distorted the EC grain sector. In turn, the
EC's commitment in the Dillon Round to bound tariffs on soybeans and meals at
zero caused a large divergence in the relative feed grain - protein concentrate
price ratios faced in the Community relative to the US, and hence a
disadvantageous cost structure for her livestock sector.
In another study, Mahe and Roe (1993) evaluated the importance
of reforms in other industrialized agricultural importers on the willingness
for the US and the EC to compromise. The results suggested that concessions by
these other countries had the effect of increasing their import demand and
raising world market prices.In the context of a Nash game where budget savings
are used to compensate the losers from reform, these effects in turn
increased the domain of policy choice over which the US and the EC could find
agreement that made neither country worse off than the status quo. The domain
was enlarged because the increase in demand for US and EC exports caused
smaller losses to US and EC producers in the export competing sectors for an
increased range of US and EC concessions. Moreover, the smaller losses
allowed the budget savings from reform to more adequately compensate the
losers. While free trade was not obtained, freer trade appeared to be a
real possibility. Thus, the extent of reform in the Round, and reform of the
CAP, may be strongly influenced by the willingness of the other mentioned
countries to make concessions;and it is in the mutual interests of the US and
the EC to encourage this outcome.
Collective action at the international level also helps to explain why and
how the various and often contradictory forces, channelled into the
agricultural trade game of the Uruguay Round, contribute to delineating the
contour of the final agreement and the nature of the reform of the CAP.
Whether the incentives for reform are sufficient to trigger action at the
national level depends in part on the prospects that a country can internalize
the gains from reform. The Most Favored Nation principle that the benefit of a15
concession made by any country must be extended to all other contracting
parties is akin to a concession being a public good. When a large number of
countries are involved, and/or when they have approximately equal world market
shares of the traded good,the incentive is reduced for an individual country
to make a concession in return for a concession from another since the
benefits of such concessions must be shared by all, i.e., the free-rider problem.
This may be a partial explanation for the failure of the group of small and
numerous countries that are low cost producers of sugar to obtain reform of US
and EC sugar policies.
The proliferation of Free Trade Areas, bilateral trade agreements
(e.g., NAFTA) and trade blocs may be seen as attempts to circumvent this external
problem, as well as to circumvent the pressures of domestic interest groups
(Paarlberg, 1987, p. 44). The existence of big players in the international
game helps to safeguard the principle of multilateral trade agreements
on which the GATT is based. Large players have incentives to negotiate
concessions (i.e., to incur costs) because, even though they will need to
share the"reformed market" with others, their relative size allows them to
capture sizeable benefits and to express credible threats that can force other
reluctant players to move as well. It appears that the US and other large
agricultural exporters have such an incentive,particularly in the form of
terms of trade gains in the grain sector. Hence, their active role as a
catalyst for collective action in the game of negotiations. A positive
externality in this case is the extension of the pressure to others to reform
this sector too, such as Japan,Korea, and the Nordic countries.
3.2.3. Summary
The major conclusion is that domestic and international forces appear
sufficiently strong to explain why reform under the GATT and the CAP is to
occur primarily in the grain sector and to some extent in the livestock
sector through the feed grain-concentrate linkage. While there is more to the
story, note that the domestic forces for reform of the CAP discussed above,
the mentioned political influence in the grains being small relative to sugar
and dairy,the major interdependencies between US and EC policies occurringin grains, and lower incentives for countries
mutual concessions,together point to trade reform
16
to free ride in making
in the grain sector.
The GATT process has therefore been supported by countries with vested
interests in the widely traded commodities (namely grains). While the EC was
motivated to undertake reform, the approach is notable because the instruments
chosen permit market forces to operate more effectively which is in sharp
contrast to the choice of production quotas for dairy in the 1984 reform of the
CAP. The large cut in EC market prices in grains and oilseeds would have
been unlikely if the domestic forces alone were the major motivating force
for change. Discrepancies between the initial Commission proposals and the
decisions of the Council support this view. The Council has constantly modified
the reform effort - and is still doing it - so as to attenuate price
adjustments and to increase the level of compensation. Furthermore, the
progressive drop of the measures to reform dairy and sugar envisaged bythe
Commission,and the relatively smaller shift toward direct payments in the
beef sector, reflect, in our view,the lack of foreign pressure from big
countries having trade interests in these areas. New Zealand interests in
dairy products and developing countries interests in sugar cane have not been
able to develop a coalition in support of their interests as have the
grain and oilseeds exporting countries. In sum, the changes in economic
conditions and the resulting imbalances and inefficiencies in European
agricultural policy developed sufficient pressure to induce reform of the CAP.
However, these pressures were not sufficient to counter those seeking to
maintain or increase protection so as to produce a reform of the magnitude and
of the market-oriented type we have witnessed.
4. EC-US AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS AND THE GATT ROUND:
A "CAP" ON THE CAP
Within Commission circles, the CAP reform was officially presented as
a separate process from the GATT negotiations. We have argued that the eventual
features included in the reform package reveal a major effort to
soothe anticipated international pressures on specific trade issues. This
is illustrated by the sizeable positive effects of the CAP reform on US
agricultural policy objectives. Our analysis (Table 4.2) suggests that the
strict implementation of the Dunkel compromise in the EC would not have provided17
larger benefits to the US than those from the CAP reform. In this light,
the continuing conflict to conclude the Round can be seen as an effort by the
grain exporters to bring the CAP under the discipline of the GATT as a
guarantee that future CAP developments be constrained more than in the past and
as an assurance that the CAP reform would be more effective, i.e., a cap on
the CAP. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, applying the
discipline of the GATT to agriculture on a multilateral basis would also serve
to countervail those interests in sectors of agriculture, such as sugar and
dairy in the US and to reform these sectors as well.
4.1. CAP reforms,world prices and implications
for future EC-US Trade Conflicts
The implications of the CAP reforms on the US arise from at least three
sources :   : i) changes in US exports to the EC, ii) expected US gains in export
volume to the Rest of the World as a result of reduced EC competition, and
iii) some terms of trade gains on grain exports. The analyses of these
linkages are based on MISS (Guyomard and Mahe, 1993). MISS is a price
equilibrium model that focuses in detail on the structure of US and EC
agriculture and agricultural policy,extended to include a simplified "Rest of
the Economy" supplying inputs to the farm sector at near infinitely elastic
supply so that prices of inputs supplied by the non farm sector are led by the
inflation rate. Technological change, growth trends in population and
per capita incomes, and other variables exogenous to the agricultural
sector are factored into the analysis.
4.1.1. World Prices
The base-run scenario corresponds to a"continuation of the pre-reform" CAP.
The results suggest that nearly all prices decline moderately in real terms.
Prices of grains,of oilseeds and particularly of grain substitutes decrease
most. The only significant exception is beef which exhibits price increases in
nominal and real terms due to a lower rate of technical change and a
higher income elasticity than other food products.These results depend on the
assumptions made regarding the evolution of the mentioned exogenous variables.
They also depend on the changes in EC price support policies in the base-run.
There is room for debate here, and alternative assumptions could be18
made on exogenous variables depending on world economic growth in the next
decade with different results for the trends in world prices.
The main effect of the CAP reform is to reduce grain exports by stimulating
domestic demand for feed and by controlling production growth. World grain
prices are 5.3 % higher in 1996 and 6.4 % higher in 1999 with respect to the
base-run scenario. Corn gluten feed price falls sharply and is 14% smaller than
in the base-run. Prices of manioc and other grainsubstitutes fall less because
their implicit protection is adjusted down andtheir supply elasticity is
larger. From 1993 to 1999, the world price ratio of corn gluten feed to grains
falls by about 5 % in the base-run and by 22.5% in the CAP reform scenario.
World prices of animal products are less affected by the CAP reform save for
beef and, to a much smaller extent, milk prices which would be respectively
5.2 and 2.7% higher than in the base-run. 
In a decoupled CAP reform scenario5, world prices are not much different
from their levels under the actual CAP. The slight difference, mainly visible
until 1996, originates from a further contraction of EC output of crops and
beef due to the complete decoupling of payments. The magnitude, however, is
limited as the set-aside requirement,according to our interpretation and our
parameters, partly offsets the incentives to produce created by acreage
payments. World prices of grain fed animal products and of grain substitutes
would be slightly lower in a fully decoupled CAP reform because of the
increased price competitiveness of grains. Sugar prices are basically
unaffected since no policy change is expected. Sugar is otherwise little
affected by the price of other crops because of its quota restriction.
The same reason explains why world dairy prices are the same in the two CAP
reform scenarios. It is also noticeable that the discrepancies in world prices
between the actual and the decoupled CAP reforms fade over time and almost
disappear at the end of the decade.
In the "Blair House"or GATT scenario,where the pre-accord is implemented
in the EC only, the picture of world price effects is generally not much
different,except for grains and feeds. World prises are lower in this GATT
5 This scenario is run assuming that acreage and headage payments
introduced by the reform are granted in a fully decoupled way, e.g., on
the basis of past criteria only. Furthermore, there is no set aside in this
scenario.19
scenario because no set aside is imposed on the arable land in the EC and only
a limited cut in producer price is mandatory to meet the 20 % reduction in AMS
and the 36 % tariff equivalent cut. The user price of grains in the EC has
to be fully aligned on the world price since exports overshoot the
allowed quantity of subsidized exports. Consequently, the EC is running
large deficiency payments in grains, exporting at world prices but much more
than under the actual CAP reform scenario and, of course, much more than under
the nearly free trade decoupled CAP reform scenario. Lower cereal and feed grain
prices also drive world prices of proteins and grain by-products further down,
but only to a small extent.
To sum up,the overall picture of world price changes due to the three EC
scenarios is that the major impact of the decoupled reform is to moderately
improve world grain prices. In the CAP reform scenario, prices of oilseeds are
a little below the level of the base-run scenario, but it is not the case in the
decoupled reform. Corn gluten feed prices are driven down sharply in the two
reform scenarios, and more so in the actual reform simulation. The prices of
animal products are also raised by the reform projects, but only in 1996 for
pork and poultry prices which are thereafter heavily influenced by EC and world
grain prices.
Table 4.1. Effects of EC reform scenarios on world prices (ratio of 1996






Graina 1.05 1.07 1.03
Protein taker 0.98 1.01 0.97
Oil 1.02 1.05 1.02
Corn gluton  feed 0.86 0.84 0.N
M6lliOC 1.00 1.00 1.00
Other grain subrtftutam 1.01 0.99 1.00
Beef 1.05 1.06 1.01
Pork, poultry and eggs 1.01 1.01 1.01
niut 1.03 1.03 1.03
Sugar 1.00 1.00 1.0120
4.1.2. Implications for the US
It is difficult to model correctly the complex US farm programs. Our
quantitative assessment meets clear limitations in that respect and will
have to be supplemented by verbal comments based on the economic
rationale of the policy instruments introduced in the Farm Act of 1990.
In our representation, target prices of grains are exogenous but loan rates
follow the trends of world prices. The loan rate on soybeans is treated
in the same way6. Market prices of pork and poultry, and of corn gluten feed
also follow world prices. For dairy7, beef and sugar,domestic prices are
pegged in nominal terms,and therefore they decrease by the rate of inflation
in real terms.
The effects of the three EC reform scenarios on the US are summarized in
Table 4.2. The main observation is that, except for budget costs and trade
balance on grains, the difference between the various EC reform scenarios is
significant,but not huge in spite of the noticeable discrepancies in world
prices highlighted previously.
Under the base-run scenario in the EC, terms of trade for US exports would
deteriorate. The export value of grains would be 1.5 billion ECU (in 1993 ECU)
lower in 1999 than in 1990. Net exports of oilseeds (and products) and of corn
gluten feed would continue to grow slightly in value.
As expected, the actual CAP reform appears attractive to the US. With
respect to the base-run, better world prices for grains reduce the US budget
costs for grains by 1.2 billion ECU (in 1996) and net exports of grains are
6 An alternative solution could be to peg the loan rates
according to the principle of marketing loans, but the loan rates themselves
may be adjusted by policy makers.
7 This is also a debatable representation as there is an extensive
discretionary power given to the administration to adjust the policies if
program cost increase. The cost associated with dairy policy must be
considered as "potential" rather than automatic.0.6 billion higherin value. The only minor adverse effects are due to the loss
of oilseeds (and products) and corn gluten feed export value because of the
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declining feed demand from the EC animal sector.
The consequences of the EC reform scenarios on US agricultural
incomes are small in relative terms, although they may be less reliable because
of the way policy programs are expressed in the model8. World prices of grains
affect the feed cost of US livestock producers, and higher grain prices, as
a result of the two CAP reform scenarios for example, translate into an income
loss for the US farm sector as a whole. This is the reason why the CAP reform
looks better than the decoupled alternative from the US farm income point
of view. Because of the absence of an adequate representation of non
participants in the US crop programs who would benefit directly from higher world
prices, the result in table 4.2 is probably too pessimistic for the US.
Table 4.2  Main effects of EC reform scenarios on US in 1999
(in billion 1993 ECU)
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8 The US income indicator mainly reacts to world prices of grains,
oilseeds and pork and poultry. There is no distinction between participants
and nonparticipants in the US grain program, and therefore, no benefit from
higher world prices on US grain producers is represented in the model. Incomes
are negatively affected by higher world grain prices. Thus, the positive
effect of the CAP reform on US incomes is probably underestimated.22
4.1.3. Trade in commodities, trade in livestock products
on a more competitive basis
The CAP reform has clearly been designed to solve the problems of EC
cash crops.The global benefits to the US in terms of budget or trade are
clear cut. The reform will also have drastic effects on price ratios in the
livestock sector which could potentially shift the contested EC-US issues from
the grains and feeds to livestock products.
Figure 4.1 shows the dramatic changes in the price ratio between grain
fed animals and grains in both the EC and the US. Similar patterns of evolution
would be observed for other animal products and other feeds. Over the next
decade, this price ratio will increase by about 30 % in the EC and decrease by
about 10 % in the US. By the end of the decade, both countries should export
these products on anearly competitive basis.
Figure 4.1. Price ratio between grain fed animals (pork
grains in the EC andthe US under the CAP reform scenario
and poultry) and
Sources   Guyomard and Mahe (1993).
Trade in animal products and particularly in poultry and even in pork
and dairy has increased more than in the basic commodities. The prospects for
trade expansion in this area are good because these products are income
elastic and consumption should grow, as the upturn in the world economy
gathers momentum. It should particularly be the case in the fast growing Newly
Industrial Countries (NIC's)  of East Asia, where land is scarce and whereenvironmental concerns will develop and increasingly
production.




that trade conflicts in livestock products, either on bilateral trade flows
between the EC and US or on third market outlets might arise. The use of
limited but targeted subsidies to capture market shares in this area are
not an unrealistic scenario. EC dairy products also can potentially become
competitive, as the general movement to lower opportunity cost of land in the EC,
dampened however by the acreage payments, and lower feed costs will drive the
shadow price of milk in the EC in the vicinity of world prices. The EC will
therefore be in a position to develop a more competitive position on cheese
and other dairy products if the market organization is adjusted in an appropriate
manner.
It is to be expected that non-tariff barriers, new technologies
(hormones) and sanitary regulations will become even more important issues in
this area than they are now. The GATT should play an increased role in
this area, and adequate surveillance procedures by the Secretariat will
become a major stake as it is clear that few countries can resist the
temptation to use non-tariff barriers on such sensitive products.
4.1.4. The operation of the CAP with market prices
in the vicinity of world prices
The assessment of the implications on EC-US relations based on the model
has focused on long-term issues and basic trends.The major changes in EC
market prices for grains and feeds do, however, raise short-run issues related
to the operation of the CAP with domestic price support close to unstable world
prices.
First, the considerable reduction in exports is likely to change the
self-sufficiency position in wheat and feed grains. It is probable that corn
supplies, at some stage in the transition period at least, fall short of
domestic demand while net wheat exports would remain positive. In such a case,
the operation of the CAP would certainly create a wedge between wheat and corn
prices because of Community preference. As Surry (1992) has shown, market
prices are driven up to the threshold price in a net importing situation and24
driven down to the intervention price in a net exporting case. Higher prices
for corn than for wheat in the EC would trigger outlets for US corn, but also
make Community preference (45 ECU/tonne, which is much larger than the target-
intervention price wedge of 10 ECU/tonne) more dissuasive. Skirmishes on
the implementation of the minimum access as specified in the GATT Draft
Final Act are therefore likely.
Such circumstances would also affect the issues on grain substitutes,
and particularly trade in corn gluten feed (CGF). First, the continuation of
unabated US flows of CGF exports to the EC, as projected by the model, calls for
some qualifications. This outcome is probable as long as EC market prices for
grains are significantly above US and world prices. However, with world prices
rising in nominal terms,our scenario of alignment of EC on world prices is
likely. It would of course be even more likely if the dollar approached its
purchasing power parity value, if world economic growth accelerates, and if
the EC set aside is not adjusted quickly enough to changes in market or
weather conditions. Such optimistic or booming prospects on world markets, which
cannot be discarded, would drastically change the prospects for feed
substitutes in the EC. Even in the absence of rebalancing, transportation
costs should provide eome wedge between US and EC values of CGF, both led by
similar world prices. The use of CGF in the US compound feed sector should
take place under these circumstances because the EC price premium would
disappear, potentially leading to a dramatic fall in exports of CGF to the EC.
A dollar appreciation would clearly enhance the probability of this course of
events, but the rise of corn and feed grain prices in the EC, due to low
self sufficiency after the CAP reform, would for some time retard this
process.
The trend in world grain prices would also change the fundamentals
of EC grain exports. The management of restitutions will be more subject to world
price shocks as the necessary level of subsidization becomes low or zero. The
EC could then target more precisely her restitutions, as the US does now, on
specific markets to be contested or preserved.
Altogether, the likely picture of EC imports and exports in the grain and
feed area is clearly moving toward more instability in prices, subsidies and
trade flows. The macroeconomic factors worldwide, and in both the EC (through the
working of the European Monetary System and the switch over) and in the US25
(exchange rates), will be essential elements of agricultural trade. Because
of the likely shocks and ratchet effects on flows due to changing price
relations, conditions are prepared for a pursuit of conflicts between the
two big players.Even the signing of a Peace Clause is not likely to overcome
the potential trade conflicts created by the fundamentals.
Figure 4.2. Price ratio between grains and corn gluten feed in the EC and the US
under the CAP reform scenario
.
3.m
Sources: Guyomard and Mahe (1993).
4.2 The GATT as a cap on the CAP
The US and the so-called fair traders have obtained, with the CAP
reform, a considerable reduction in EC competition in third markets by the cut
in price incentives and by a freeze of resources in the cash crop sectors.
Still, they are not satisfied with this unilateral reform because past
experiences seem to have taught them that the EC is unable to timely adjust
price support levels to technical change and world market conditions in
a manner that precludes a loss in their market shares. Hence,their response
to this reform suggests that it does not provide the guarantees that the
disciplines of the GATT will apply. This is likely why the US and the Cairns
Group firmly rejected the EC negotiating position that specific
commitments on trade policies were unnecessary because they would result
automatically from the cut in internal support.
This is one of the reasons for the US proposals to have included specific26
and often different commitments on various trade barriers9. Therefore, two
areas of negotiation were added to the PSE-AMS approach which had a more
central role in the early than in the later stages of the Round. This is at
variance with the expectation that the AMS would play an important role, when
for the first time, domestic policies were supposed to be scrutinised in the
negotiation process and then disciplined by the GATT.
The post mid-term US proposals (1989, 1990) focused on tariffication
and export competition, insisting that export subsidies should be reduced
at a faster pace than import barriers. Moreover, the concept of tariffication
was also aiming at the elimination of the long denounced variable
levy-restitution system.
These elements are in fact consistent with the GATT philosophy which
promotes transparency of trade barriers, bound tariffs and which does not
allow dumping practices. The GATT Secretariat and the President of the Trade
Negotiation Group on Agriculture supported this line,as reflected in the De
Zeeuw paper (1990) and more systematically in the Dunkel compromise (1991).
The discrimination against export subsidization was justified by the GATT
general principles but put a disproportionate burden of adjustment on the EC as
compared to the US for example (Guyomard and Mahe, 1991).
The lack of confidence among the more competitive exporters in the
unilateral CAP reform is further illustrated by the introduction of a new
concept in commitments, i.e., the obligation of results in trade
liberalization. Hence, the introduction of the concept of minimum access to
imports and the specified reduction in subsidized export quantities included in
the Dunkel compromise. These elements are clearly aimed at countering the
temptation of the EC to maintain a sizeable exporting activity based on






other words, the GATT Round was seen as an opportunity to
EC decision making and to "put a cap on the CAP".
the Uruguay Round has often appeared as a "combat des chefs"
economic giants,it is also true that multilateralization of the
was a way to promote positive-externalitiesin the reform
9Another reason includes the attempt to minimize adjustment
protected sectors (CARD, 1991).
in the27
process. Most studies (e.g. OECD, 1987, Johnson et al., . ..) suggest that
joint liberalization increases world prices. For most developed countries,
this would reduce the cost of adjustment or increase the benefits of net
exporters due to further improvements in terms of trade. Hence, the efforts of
the US and the Cairns countries to continue the multilateral process.
4.3. The GATT is also a means to help so-called fair traders
do some housekeeping at home
The process of negotiating a treaty for agriculture under GATT principles
requires that negotiators reach agreement on rules. These rules, however,
cannot be commodity specific even if strategies were clearly designed so
as to maximize other countries concessions while minimizing own
concessions.10  The rules,tailored according to this strategy, must be in line
with the GATT philosophy of reducing import barriers and especially the
reduction of subsidies to exports that up to now were tolerated under article
XVI.
Rules, as they are specified in the Draft Final Act, are complex and their
differences according to instruments reflect the strategies of the various
countries to capture trade gains at minimum political cost. Still, the
protected sectors (sugar, dairy) should not escape the obligation of adjustment
in the future. This is how the compromise will impose a revision of the CAP
reform in a direction more consistent with the first Commission proposals and
will help to reduce price support in the dairy and sugar sectors. Eventually
enlarging the cap on the CAP. This change in the political balance of domestic
forces between reform supporters and opponents will also extend to the countries
who have a tendency to present themselves as free traders, but who
nonetheless have highly protected sectors that they have been unable to reform.
Again, the US is probably the best example of this case as illustrated by the
10 There is ample evidence that most delegations have followed that
route. Canada is an example when it strived to get production quotas treated
in a more lenient fashion than other price support policies without supply
control. The US is another case in point when the choice of the reference
period for the AMS reduction is clearly designed to minimize support cuts
under this rule. Japan is the extreme case in that respect, but the EC's
reluctance to accept specific commitments on subsidized exports is another
example of this general attitude.28
commodities which are sheltered by the 1955 waiver in the GATT.
Whether these factors were an intended positive spill-over effect of the
US Administration in the early stages of the Round or a reflection of the
economic philosophy of the Republican Administration is difficult to
determine. The latter is doubtful, however,since otherwise the sugar policy
in the US would have been liberalized to the benefit of sugar cane producers
from developing countries independently from the GATT process.
4.4 Summary
Our interpretation of the course of events observed in the agricultural
component of the Round is therefore that expected trade gains in key sectors of
key countries were the necessary circumstances to promote collective action at
the international level. This action also served to counter collective action
at the domestic level which would otherwise have likely resulted in the
status quo. Highly protectionist countries like Japan and the EC (for even
further reasons due to her super-national nature) almost surely would not have
promoted the discipline of agricultural policies under GATT rules, in spite of
their general trade interest in sectors other than agriculture. The role the US
played in the early stages of the GATT treaty such as insisting that agriculture
be given special treatment, and its efforts to obtain the waiver are
ample pieces of evidence to suggest that it would not have pursued free trade on
philosophic grounds alone. The changed economic conditions, particularly in
comparative advantage, and the threats from the EC on trade interests
in specific commodities were sufficient to induce it to seek an effective
result in this Round.
5. LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES OF EC-US TRADE
The CAP remains on the whole inefficient and inequitable to consumers and
taxpayers, and to selected farmers whose incomes are supported unevenly. The
main motivation for farm support in the EC is the existing low remuneration to
resources, labor in particular, invested in farming. Consequently, in the long
term, intersectoral mobility of resources is the natural remedy for low
agricultural incomes, and policy makers should find ways of facilitating this
transfer at the least social cost. A proper long-term policy favoring resource
mobility and structural adjustment in agriculture is then essential to reduce
in the future justified claims for public support. Consequently, long-term29
perspectives on the EC-US agricultural trade will be largely dependent on the
impact of CAP reform on the farm structure.
5.1 Conflicting Objectives:
Structural impact of EC common and national policies
The traditional CAP has been focusing on price support, without a strategy
for structural adjustment. The Guidance section of EAGGF has always accounted
for less than 5% of the fund, even though, according to the initial views of EC
policy makers,its size should have been at least one third of common expenditure
in agriculture.Structural policy has been left to the initiative of member
states, whose main concerns were focused on safeguarding farm incomes and
adequate levels of agricultural employment.
As a result, farm structure in the EC, which was quite uneven before the
institution of the EC, has failed to become more homogeneous. In northern
countries, farm structures have moderately improved along with labor
productivity. In southern countries, farm structures have improved at a much
lower rate and labor productivity is still very low. Notwithstanding
considerable rates of labor out migration (e.g., in Italy and Spain), farm
structure did not change substantially, and a large number of inefficient farms
are still present together with a smaller number of larger and more competitive
farms. In fact, the declared objective of some national policies has been to
keep a large number of working people in agriculture. For example, the
objectives of the Italian "Piano Agricolo Nazionale" are, i) to support and
increase farm incomes,and ii) to safeguard agricultural employment especially
for young people, and in less developed regions.
These objectives of the Italian agricultural policy are clearly hindering
the intersectoral mobility of resources,and of labor in particular. This may
help to explain why Italy, although importing almost one fifth of its food
needs, accounts for a labor share in total employment in terms of Annual Work
Units (AWU's) which is still double or triple that of other EC countries
enjoying approximately the samelevel of economic development, such as The
Netherlands and Belgium.
Unfortunately, in the EC as a whole, the distribution of farms per
class of farmer's income is more similar to Italy than to the Dutch. Family farm
income per AWU in half of EC farms is still less than 5000 ECU per year, not
withstanding the substantial price and income support granted by the CAP. Thismay explain, to a certain extent, the more liberal approach of Dutch policy
makers and farmers unions regarding the GATT negotiations as compared to the more
conservative positions held by some other member states.
This excess labor retained in agriculture, especially in the less
developed regions,is likely to be the combined effect of both the EC price
support policy and the pseudo-structural policies implemented at the national
level. The invisible nature of most income transfers to farmers was disguising
the real contribution of agricultural employment to social welfarell.
The 1992 CAP reform, by substituting explicit direct subsidies for




productivity of farm labor,not only as perceived by consumers and tax
but also as understood by farmers. To the contrary, in the dairy sub-
where production quotas were introduced in 1984, the existing level of
transparency has been further reduced,hindering the intersectoral mobility of
resources and structural adjustment.
5.2 Long-term effects of the CAP reform
The long-term effects of the CAP reform are obviously very important in
order to understand whether it will effectively contribute to solving the
farm problems and favor a more efficient international allocation of
resources, or whether it will be a palliative aiming at maintaining present
economic rents in some farms and regions together with inefficient farm
structures in other regions. "Gattopardismo" has been very frequent in
past CAP reforms.
The EC Council of Ministers on May 1992 decided that the compensation of
farmers for income losses due to reduced price support should be paid on a year
to year basis. This decision is likely to have the following consequences:
i) The administrative costs of computing compensations and validating
farmer's annual declarations will be a major burden on EC and national
budgets,with wider possibilities for fraud.
11 Social security invisible transfers were substantial, accounting for
more than 50% of public expenditure in agriculture in early eighties.
Altogether, income transfer to agriculture was approximately equal to the
sectoral value added (Tarditi and Croci-Angelini, 1988, p. 28 and 70).
Unfortunately, the survey on national expenditure in agriculture (CEC, 1982)
initiated by the EC Commission in the early eighties, and providing extremely
interesting information, was never updated.31
ii) It would not be advisable to modulate compensation according to farm
size in the case where they are paid yearly without running the risk of hindering
structural adjustment while they install incentives to meet the conditions to
maximize payments. Maintaining smaller and less efficient farms would mean
receiving every year higher compensations.
iii) Farmers running small holdings will be encouraged to remain in the
agricultural sector in order to receive their payments, thus limiting the
intersectoral and intersectoral labor mobility.
iv) Farmers are continually uncertain of their future payments. This
could encourage them to take a conservative approach in making structural
improvements, and induce them to spend time and money convincing the
political sector to guarantee their compensation.
v) Employment in farming will decrease less and some extra,
employment will be created in the public sector in order to implement the
new administrative practices and controls. However, the marginal contribution
of this extra employment to social welfare is likely to be negative.
The newly born reform of the CAP is likely to show its advantages
in the upcoming years, but its intrinsic contradictions will be more
apparent as well.
5.3. Long-term benefits of a more decoupled CAP reform
Society may be justified in granting direct payments to farmers for the
conservation of natural resources and other environmentally saving practices.
Positive externalities are currently produced by agriculture, but as they are
public goods, they are not valued by market prices. On the other hand,
compensations for income losses due to reduced price support after the CAP reform
may be paid as a lump sum,allowing farmers to accumulate future payments for a
number of years12. In order to avoid sudden budgetary problems, lump-sum
payments could be financed by the EC budget in the form of bonds, saleable on the
financial markets,as recently proposed by the Land Use and Food Policy Inter
Group (LUFPIG) of the European Parliament. (Marsh et al., 1991)
If a lump-sum compensation, for the reduction in incomes is computed for
12 The LUFPIG proposal at the European Parliament envisioned a 15 year
period. The same period has been assumed for a simulation of the impact of a
decoupled CAP reform on markets and prices (Folmer et al., 1993).32
a number of years and, for example, offered to farmers as bonds saleable on
the financial markets, farmers would have the choice to cash annually the
payment or to sell the bonds and cash, at any time, their discounted cumulative
compensation for future payments.
The long-term effects on structural adjustment of this more decoupled
feature of the CAP reform are quite interesting, they include:
i) Bureaucratic costs would be reduced and the possibility of fraud
decreased as the administrative work of calculating and analyzing payments
would only have to be done once.
ii) Compensation could be modulated according to farm size, or to other
parameters, without generating inefficient resource allocation in the
future. Investment decisions could then be based mainly on market conditions
and there will be less public incentive for owning a smaller farm instead of a
more efficient and viable one.
iii) Proper environmental standards could be targeted by means of
regulation, incentives for positive externalities and disincentives
on negative externalities, without directly hindering a more efficient
allocation of resources. Land set aside could be encouraged on the
basis of conservation objectives, and not to manage supply control for
reasons of complacency towards foreign competitors.
iv) Labor mobility out of agriculture would not be hindered.
v) Farmers' incomes would not be tied directly to policy makers. The
spending for lobbying would be reduced and farmers would be more reliant on
actual market prices.
Although accepting its economic advantages, these decoupled aspects of a
bolder CAP reform may be considered too risky by policy makers whose
concerns are focused on possible demographic and territorial problems. Lump-sum
compensations could then be tested on a specific section of the agricultural
sector, e.g.,providing this extra choice only to smaller, economically nonviable
farms, or limiting lump sum compensations to specific EC regions where
agricultural employment is clearly excessive. Such a scheme would favor the
needed structural adjustment. Complementary measures for restructuring farms
in these areas and fostering economic development in other economic sectors
are also clearly necessary to promote regional and rural development on a
wider economic basis than the agricultural sector alone.33
6. CONCLUSION
The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy has amounted to the
substitution of new income support instruments for the usual price policy,
essentially in the cash crop sector. Our first point is that the domestic
political balance was unable to generate such a large change in policy design,
in spite of inefficiencies and imbalancesdue to the traditional CAP. The
pressure of the US has been a major factor in the evolution of the reform. We
argue that trade interests have been crucial to catalyze international collective
action in order to counteract domestic pressure groups. Apparently, the reform
satisfies the US objectives as well as the GATT compromise. The US gains from
the CAP reform are noticeable, but we do not foresee the disappearance of sources
of tension between the EC and the US, as EC animal products become more
competitive and as the working of the CAP in the vicinity of world prices will
make trade flows sensitive to agricultural and macro-economics shocks.
According to some quantitative estimates13, which are consistent
with ours, the expected effect of a decoupled CAP reform on trade flows
between the EC and the US should not be too dramatic as a whole. The increased
extensification related to a larger number of economically viable farms will
likely be balanced by reduced land set-aside, improving the allocation of
resources.
The most interesting effects should be apparent in the changing
perspectives for further trade liberalization, as intersectoral labor
mobility and lower farm production costs are essential conditions for allowing
a further reduction in farm support and for developing a freer
international trade for agricultural products without excessive burden on
consumers and taxpayers. Improved structural adjustment, generating lower
production costs and lower demand for protection, is likely to be the best
safeguard against continuing requests for protectionist measures both in the EC
and the US. A less interventionist policy by the EC and the US is likely to be
followed by other developed countries and favor a more efficient international
allocation of resources.
The CAP could then
environmental conservation
13For example, Folmer
concentrate more on providing incentives for
and improvement, subsidizing farmers in less
et al., 1993.34
developed regions where depopulation could occur and favoring a better income
distribution through decoupled policy instruments.However, as domestic special
interests,both in the EC and the US, are still very strong, such a completion
of the CAP reform is likely to be possible only if external pressures for
reform are joined by domestic political pressures from consumers and by a
more socially oriented attitude of policy makers (Tarditi, 1993).
The pursuit of an agreement in the GATT is therefore a means to keep
further developments in the CAP under control and to promote the positive
externalities from multilateral reform. Hence, the search for a package dressed
up along the principles of the GATT and based on trade barriers rather than on
effective support reduction. This package has the further benefits of
fostering the capability of the proponents of action to actually reform their
most protected sectors like sugar and dairy which they were unable to adjust
in isolation. The magnitude of changes in these sectors will be limited, but
the GATT will put a cap not only on the CAP but also on the support of
the protected industries in otherwise agricultural export oriented countries.
It appears that the Uruguay Round will succeed in placing agriculture
partly under the GATT. This success is not satisfactory however, and the
long-run objective of further decoupling of payments from production
incentives should be pursued in order to promote agricultural trade on a more
competitive basis and to reserve intervention of the State to the promotion of
public goods.35
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